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THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE
CONNECTICUT CONSTITUTION
by Richard S. Kay*
The transformation of a law school from an institution of voca-
tional competence into one of intellectual excellence is often associated
with an increased attention to legal subjects that are national in scope.
It is fair to say that as the University of Connecticut School of Law
has grown in academic quality and ambition it has acquired that
breadth of curricular offerings and scholarly interest which, we like to
think, entitle it to be regarded as a national law school of the first rank.
This has become particularly apparent under, and in large measure be-
cause of, the.decanal leadership of Phillip Blumberg.
It is also true, however, that this broadening of interest need not
be accompanied by an abandonment of a special concern for the legal
issues and problems that are peculiar to a law school's home. Certainly
that has been the case with the University of Connecticut School of
Law. Of particular interest here is continuing scholarly attention to the
law of Connecticut,1 which has been strongly encouraged and sup-
ported by Dean Blumberg. Such scholarship has two special values.
* Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law. A.B., Brandeis University;,
M.A., Yale University;, J.D., Harvard University. Professor Kay teaches Constitutional Law,
Commercial Law, and Contracts.
1. See, e.g., L. ORLAND, CONNECTICT CRIMINAL PRACTICE (1983); C. TMT & J. LAPLANTE
HANDBOOK OF CONNECTICUT EVIDENCE (1976); T. TONDRO, CONNECTICUT LAND USE REGULA-
TION (1979); Special Section The Connecticut Constitution, 15 CONN. L REV. 7 (1982);
Bysiewicz, Connecticut: ERA, 51 CONN. BJ. 113 (1977); Mann, Rationality. Legal Change, and
Community in Connecticut 1690-1760, 14 LAw & Soc'Y. REV. 202 (1980); Sacks, Promises.
Performance, and Principles: An Empirical Study of Parole Decislonmaking In Connecticut. 9
CONN. L. REV. 347 (1977); Tait, The New Federal Rules of Evidence" A Summary of the Differ-
ences Between the Rules and the Connecticut Law of Evidence, 9 CONN. L REV. 1 (1975).
In addition, notes and comments by members of the Connecticut Law Review provide useful
insight into developments in Connecticut law on an ongoing basis. Among the more recent articles
are: Note, Connecticut's Lis Pendens Shapes Up: Williams v. Bartlett, 16 CONN. L REV 413
(1984); Note, Court Rule-Making in Connecticut Revisited-Three Recent Decisions: State v.
King, Steadwell v. Warden and State v. Canady, 16 CONN. L. REV. 121 (1983); Note, Employee
Right to Active Union Representation at Investigative Interviews: The Connecticut State Labor
Board Decision in State Department of Education, 16 CONN. L. REV. 179 (1983).
CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW
First, it allows the school to make a contribution to the state which
sustains and nurtures it by providing that critical examination which is
prerequisite to improving the quality of law. Second, the study of legal
problems within the limited bounds of one jurisdiction may allow a
thoroughness of inquiry which more global approaches foreclose. Con-
sequently it may shed light on a more general subject in ways not oth-
erwise possible. Thus the two missions of a state law school, general
and specific, national and local, reinforce each other.
A particularly compelling example of the special insight considera-
tion of state law may supply into more general questions is provided by
the recent decision of the Supreme Court of Connecticut in the case of
Cologne v. Westfarms Associates.2 That case illustrates the necessary
connection between the roles played by the constitutional law of a state
and the constitutional law of the United States. It also illuminates cer-
tain fundamental questions which are inevitably prior to any legal the-
ory of constitutional adjudication.
The plaintiffs in Westfarms, Christine Cologne and the Connecti-
cut National Organization for Women (NOW), desired to solicit signa-
tures on petitions supporting the proposed Equal Rights Amendment to
the United States Constitution in the Westfarms Mall, a large enclosed
shopping center owned and operated by the defendants. When the de-
fendants denied access to the mall for that purpose, the plaintiffs
brought suit in the superior court to enjoin the defendants from inter-
fering with NOW's petitioning in the mall. The plaintiffs claimed that
the defendants' refusal to allow their activity was a violation of NOW's
constitutional right to freedom of expression. The superior court
granted the injunction and required the mall to allow NOW to petition
for a limited period and under specified conditions. Upon the expiration
of this period and the renewal of the mall's original policy, NOW
brought a second action asking for permanent access to the mall for
petitioning and for distributing literature. A second superior court
judge granted a permanent injunction requiring access, but also limit-
ing the activities permitted to certain times and subjects. It was this
second judgment which was brought on appeal to the Connecticut Su-
preme Court.
The plaintiffs could not base their claim on the first amendment to
the United States Constitution. In three decisions in the 1960's and
2. Cologne v. Westfarms Assocs., 192 Conn. 48, 469 A.2d 1201 (1984) [hereinafter
Westfarms].
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1970's the United States Supreme Court had recognized, narrowed,
and finally rejected the idea that rights of free expression were asserti-
ble against private parties and, in particular, against privately owned
shopping centers.3 Rather, the plaintiffs relied on sections four and
fourteen of Article First of the Connecticut Constitution, the state Dec-
laration of Rights. In so doing, they asked the Connecticut court to
follow the lead of the supreme courts of three other states, which had
found that their state constitutions protected the right of expression
against infringement by private parties as well as the state.5 Because
these decisions were based on independent state law, they were in no
way inconsistent with the United States Supreme Court's holding that
the first amendment did not extend so far. Indeed, the United States
Supreme Court had explicitly held that the restriction on private con-
duct that such an interpretation of a state constitution entailed did not,
in the kind of case at issue in Westfarms, constitute an impermissible
interference with federal constitutional rights.6
Both trial courts that granted the relief requested by the plaintiffs
distinguished the Connecticut free expression clauses from the federal
one on the basis of the different language employed. After balancing
the competing private interests to determine the scope of the constitu-
tional protection afforded in this case, both courts held that NOW's
need to use the mall as a forum to petition and disseminate information
outweighed the defendants' interest in controlling the use of their prop-
erty.7 The results were the limited injunctions granted. The Connecti-
3. Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 US. 308
(1968); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972); Hudgcns v. NLRB, 424 U.. 507 (1976).
4. CONN. CONsT. art. I, §§ 4, 14:
§ 4. Every citizen may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects,
being responsible for the abuse of that liberty.
§ 14. The citizens have a right, in a peaceable manner, to assemble for their common
good, and to apply to those invested with the powers of government, for redress of griev-
ances, or other proper purposes, by petition, address or remonstrance.
5. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees and Reply Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 39-47, IVestfarms.
Plaintiffs argued that the Westfarms facts were indistinguishable from those in three other shop-
ping center cases, Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal.
Rptr. 854 (1979), affd sub nom. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980);
Batchelder v. Allied Stores Int'l, 388 Mass. 83, 445 N.E.2d 590 (1983); Alderwood Assocs. v.
Washington Envtl. Council, 96 Wash. 2d 230, 635 P.2d 108 (1981). Further support for such
protection, they argued, came from two cases allowing access to campuses of private universities,
State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 423 A.2d 615 (1980), appeal dismissed sub nmi. Princeton Univer-
sity v. Schmid, 455 U.S. 100 (1982); Commonwealth v. Tate, 495 Pa. 158. 432 A.2d 1382 (1981).
6. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
7. Record at 85-112, Westfarms;, Cologne v. Westfarms Assocs., 37 Conn. Supp. 90, 442 A.2d
19i"4]
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cut Supreme Court reversed. The majority, in an opinion delivered by
Justice Shea, based its decision entirely on its understanding of the in-
tention of the framers of the Declaration of Rights.8 The fact that the
free expression guarantee of section four expressed the right in affirma-
tive terms, and did not specifically mention infringement by govern-
ment, did not persuade the majority that this provision should be
viewed as a departure from what it had concluded was the framers'
primary intention: to shield citizens from oppressive acts of the state.9
Having made this determination, the majority expressly declined to
consider the relative weights of the competing interests of the parties,
finding that to be the proper concern not of the judiciary, but of the
legislature. 10
As indicated earlier the invocation of the state constitution by the
plaintiffs in Westfarms, in light of the unavailability of any federal
constitutional claim, is consistent with an increasingly apparent trend
in constitutional litigation.11 After a period of receptivity to claims of
new kinds of constitutional rights in the 1960's, the United States Su-
preme Court, in the 1970's and 1980's, came to be seen as both inhos-
pitable to novel claims and, in general, reluctant to make federal judi-
cial forums available to litigants seeking reform in the law. This
withdrawal of the United States Constitution as a potential warrant for
desired substantive legal changes provided an incentive for exploring
the possibilities inherent in state constitutional law, possibilities which,
due to the successful exploitation of federal law, had lain dormant for
many years. 12 Moreover, such state constitutional rights, once estab-
lished, would be immune to revision by the United States Supreme
Court under the doctrine of the adequate state ground. 3 The history of
471 (1982).
8. 192 Conn. 48, 469 A.2d 1201 (1984).
9. Id. at.63, 469 A.2d at 1209.
10. Id. at 64-66, 469 A.2d at 1209-10.
11. See supra note 3.
12. See, e.g., Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV.
L. REV. 489, 495 (1977); Collins, Reliance on State Constitution-Away From a Reactionary
Approach, 9 HASTINGS CO NST. L.Q. 1 (1981); Macgill, Upon a Peak in Darien: Discovering the
Connecticut Constitution, 15 CONN. L. REv. 7 (1982); Newman, The "Old Federalism": Protec-
tion of Individual Rights By State Constitutions in an Era of Federal Court Passivity, 15 CONN.
L. REV. 21, 21-22 (1982); Developments in the Law-The Interpretation of State Constitutional
Rights, 95 HARv. L. REv. 1324, 1328-29 (1982); Project Report, Toward An Activist Role for
State Bills of Rights, 8 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 271 (1973).
13. The latest Supreme Court exposition of this doctrine is Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct.
3469, 3474-78 (1983).
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the state action requirement in connection with attempted speech at
privately owned shopping centers, and the subsequent recourse to state
law, provides a prime example of this phenomenon.
The possibility that different state and federal constitutional rules
may operate on the same activity illustrates one feature of the Ameri-
can scheme of constitutional limitations. Constitutions exist largely to
place limits on what is deemed td be undesirable interference with indi-
vidual activity. These limits are of two broad types. First, and most
obviously, are what may be called substantive limits. These are explicit
rules protecting certain specified preferred activities and, conversely,
prohibiting those actions that would curtail them. Some limits of this
type are found in the body of the 1787 Constitution, but they appear
most prominently in the amendments and particularly in the Bill of
Rights. In Connecticut, and in every other state, such limits are incor-
porated into the state constitution by means of a declaration or bill of
rights.
A second kind of limit, which might be called a structural limit,
arises from the way in which the constitution sets up governmental in-
stitutions and allocates power among them. Because divided power is
more difficult to use effectively, private conduct is protected to the ex-
tent that public power is so weakened. This idea is well-known as the
doctrine of separation of powers. 4 Both the United States Constitution
and every state constitution distribute all governmental power among
three independent departments-executive, judicial, and legislative."5
But, in the United States, there is another structural division which
further limits the capacity of government to act: the division of author-
ity between state and federal governments. 16 When it is remembered
that, even within their proper spheres of power, state and federal gov-
ernments are each further restricted both by internal structural limits
and by explicit substantive limits, an impressive set of safeguards for
individual action becomes apparent.
But this intricate system of constitutional limitations is not self-
executing. Its practical effect depends upon the existence of an agency
which can announce when there is a transgression of the explicit limits
or when a unit of government has acted outside its defined area of au-
thority. That responsibility has been given to the courts. And because,
14. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (J. Madison). The same notion explains, in part, the attrac-
tion of bicameral legislatures. Ad. at 322 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
15. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, II, III. E.g., CONN. CONST. art. V.
16. THE FEDERAUST No. 51 (J. Madison).
1984]
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as a matter of law, the courts are beyond review in their determinations
in this regard, the actual limits in effect at any given time will,
necessarily, depend upon a combination of the constitutional rules and
the actions of the courts in constitutional adjudication. Therefore, any
study of constitutional protections must include both the constitutional
rules and the jurisprudence of the judges to whom the rules are
entrusted.
In Cologne v. Westfarms Associates, the Supreme Court of Con-
necticut faced a fundamental choice as to the way in which courts and
constitutional rules should interrelate in shaping the law of the consti-
tution. Two kinds of arguments were put before the court. (These argu-
ments were not associated with the different sides of the case. Indeed
each side relied on both kinds of arguments.11 ) Each was based on an
implicit assumption about that relationship and about the tasks that
are proper for courts to undertake in constitutional adjudication.
The first kind of argument appealed exclusively to the text of the
constitution and to the intentions of those who wrote and ratified it as
to how it should operate.18 For example, the court was asked to deal
with the fact that section four of the Declaration of Rights referred to
the right of free expression in affirmative terms, and not as a mere
prohibition on action of the government, in contrast to both the federal
first amendment and other provisions of the state constitution. The
same presuppositions underlay the argument that the court should be
influenced by the historical evidence that the enactors of the constitu-
tion were preoccupied with problems of keeping government in order,
and not at all with regulating private conduct.2 0 These were arguments
of constitutional interpretation in the strict sense. The majority opinion
of the court appears to be overwhelmingly a response to this kind of
argument. 21
The second kind of argument focused, not on abstract rules, but on
the flesh and blood interests at stake. Thus the court was urged to con-
17. See infra notes 18-25 and accompanying text.
18. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees and Reply Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 10-38, Westfarms;
Defendants' Brief at 10-19, Westfarms; Brief of Defendants-Appellees Victor J. Dowling and
Brief of Defendants-Cross Appellants Victor J. Dowling at 13-20, Westfarms. The relative roles of
text and original intention, inter se, is, of course, an unsettled and difficult question even if this
form of argument is accepted as proper. See infra notes 27 & 41.
19. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees and Reply Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 23-28, Westfarms.
20. Defendants' Brief at 10-19, Westfarms; Brief of Defendants-Appellees Victor J. Dowling
and Brief of Defendants-Cross Appellants Victor J. Dowling at 13-16, Westfarms.
21. See infra notes 31-42 and accompanying text.
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sider the critical position of free expression in preserving democratic
government.22 It was asked to examine the changing character of shop-
ping centers in our social topography and the possible impact on society
of their elimination as sites of public discussion.2 3 Similarly, other ar-
guments called on the court to measure the injury that might be in-
flicted on the value of the defendants' property by requiring access and
the risk that they might be unfairly associated with views with which
they disagreed.24 The court was then to weigh and balance these com-
peting private and social values and to reconcile them or order them in
the form of a proper constitutional rule.2 5 This kind of argument was
clearly the main concern of the trial courts and accounts for the de-
22. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees and Reply Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 47-56. iWestfaons.
23. Id. at 50-56.
24. Defendants' Brief at 44-49, 61-62, Westfarms. The kind of argument in which these inter-
ests figured took more than one shape. In one, they were asserted as federal constitutional rights
of the defendants which, if violated, would take precedence over any state constitutional rights of
the plaintiffs. Although this conclusion was rejected by the United States Supreme Court in a very
similar situation in Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 80-88 (1980), the trial
court in the second Westfarms case seemed to accept it as a basis for balancing the rights and
limiting the access granted to NOW. Record at 102-06, Iestfarms. The trial court in the first
Westfarms case is less clear in this regard. See 37 Conn. Supp. at 112-16. 442 A.2d at 477-80.
These interests might also be part of an investigation of the reasonableness of "time, place and
manner" regulations imposed by the private property owner. See Robins v. Pruncyard Shopping
Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 910-11, 592 P.2d 341, 347-48, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854, 860-61 (1979). Com-
mentators have suggested that the weighing of the various interests is part or a single inquiry as to
the extent of the rights of expression against private parties. See Margulies, A Lawyer's View of
the Connecticut Constitution, 15 CONN. L. REV. 107, 111-15 (1982). This approach seems most
clearly to have been adopted by the Washington Supreme Court in Alderwood Assocs. v. Wash-
ington Envil. Council, 96 Wash. 2d 230, 244, 635 P.2d 108, 117 (1981) ("Instead, being sensitive
to the competing speech and property rights, we conclude that section 5 and amendment 7 are
applicable when, after balancing all the interests, the balance favors the speech and initiative
activity.").
Another balancing factor which was vigorously advanced in WVestfarms involved the special
value of state autonomy in the federal system. The state action requirement of the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution, it was claimed, is principally a device by which the
intrusive effect of federal constitutional requirements on state decision-making can be reduced.
Such a value could not be served by any state action requirement in a state constitution. 192
Conn. at 82, 469 A.2d at 1218 (Peters, J., dissenting). The exclusion of this factor in the resulting
state law balance would then tip the decision against a finding that state action was necessary.
Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees and Reply Brief of Plaintiffs-Appllants at 31-39, Westfarmns; Mar-
gulies, supra, at 110-12. If a balancing approach is proper, this argument is reasonable. But even
then the force of this argument is limited insofar as it fails to account for the value of legislative
autonomy in regulating private conduct. That value is furthered by a state action requirement,
whether the constitutional rule being so limited is of federal or state origin. See Deukmejian, All
Sail and No Anchor-Judicial Review Under the California Constitution, 6 HASTINGs CoNsr.
L.Q. 975 (1979); Note, Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center Free Speech Access to Shopping
Centers Under the California Constitution, 68 CAUF. L. REV. 641, 658-60 (1980).
25. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees and Reply Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 47-73, tVestfarms.
1984]
CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW
tailed limitations on the relief granted, which specified the dates, loca-
tions, manner, and topics of NOW's activities in the mall."
26. The order appealed from provided:
Now, therefore, it is hereby ordered that during the annual period of January 1
through September 30, the defendants shall be, and hereby are restrained and enjoined
from prohibiting the plaintiffs' solicitation by voice, signs and descriptive materials of
signatures on petitions in support of legislation pertaining to: (1) Aid to Families of De-
pendent Children; (2) Pay Equity Between the Sexes; (3) Sex Discrimination in Insur-
ance Contracts; (4) Enforcement of Child Support Orders; and (5) Renewal of the Com-
mission on Human Rights and Opportunities, at a single location in the Grand Court of
the Mall to be designated by the defendants, on the following terms and conditions:
(1) The plaintiffs will conduct their activities every Saturday during normal business
hours, unless such schedule interferes with Mall sponsored activities, in which event a
substitute day in close proximity thereto will be offered by the defendants. Should the
plaintiffs wish to suspend their activity on any Saturday or other allowed day, they will
promptly notify the center manager.
(2) The plaintiffs will supply a card table not to exceed three feet by six feet in size,
no more than four chairs, and a proper receptacle for litter, but the defendants, at their
option, may offer to substitute their property for any or all of such furniture.
(3) The plaintiffs will be allowed to post two signs, not to exceed two feet by three
feet in size, on or adjacent to their table announcing their presence and purpose.
(4) The plaintiffs will be confined to the center or grand court in the immediate area
of their table and chairs and to the space within ten feet of their table.
(5) The plaintiffs will confine their activities to the authorized area and will not
expand into the remaining space of the grand court, or use the walkways, entranceways,
exits, parking lots or other common areas of the Mall for their permitted activities.
(6) The plaintiffs will have no more than four persons engaged in the permitted
activities within the authorized area.
(7) The plaintiffs will maintain a normal conversational tone, and will not use any
amplifying sound, recording, radio or TV equipment.
(8) The plaintiffs will refrain from: (a) verbally inviting patrons to their table and
authorized area; (b) approaching patrons outside the authorized area; (c) physically ob-
structing or verbally interfering with patrons; and (d) restricting in any other way the
free movements of patrons and shoppers on the premises.
(9) The plaintiffs will not be allowed to distribute membership applications, or to
solicit membership applications, fees, funds, donations or contributions, but materials dis-
tributed in support of the permitted activities may contain instructions for off-premises
voluntary participation in membership application and financial support of the plaintiffs'
activities.
(10) No eating or drinking by plaintiffs' personnel will be permitted at their table or
within the court area or surrounding walkways.
(11) The plaintiffs will allow no litter to be discarded in the area of the grand court
other than in waste receptables [sic], and will periodically police and clean all litter in
the walkways of the Mall resulting from materials distributed by them, and for this pur-
pose will not be limited in the number of their personnel allowed on the premises.
(12) The defendants will instruct their security force to protect all rights, persons
and property of the plaintiffs in connection with their permitted activities.
(13) The defendants will be allowed to post signs with noncontroversial texts, the
number, size and location to be at their discretion, disavowing and disclaiming any en-
dorsement, sponsorship or support of the plaintiffs' presence, activities, purpose and goals.
[Vol. 16:667
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These two kinds of arguments 2 and the assumptions on which
they are based can be associated with two different views of the job of
a court in constitutional adjudication and, therefore, for the reasons
suggested, with two different notions of the way in which constitutional
(14) The plaintiffs' permitted activities shall be subject to such further reasonable
regulations as to time, place and manner as the defendants may prescribe to assure that
the plaintiffs do not interfere with the movement and rights or owners, operators, patrons,
shoppers and occupants of the shopping center and to minimize any possible interference
of the plaintiffs with the commercial functions of the Mall.
(15) All authorized signs, descriptive materials and petitions shall be confined to the
five content issues recited in the court's restraining order hereinabove.
(16) Upon reasonable request, the plaintiffs shall provide to the defendants copies of
descriptive materials and individual unsigned petitions in support of the permitted
activities.
192 Conn. at 52-54 n.2.
The same kind of arguments, stressing the balance of competing values and interests, seemed
to influence the other state courts which held state constitutional rights of expression to be asserti-
ble against private shopping centers. See cases cited supra note 5; Developments In the Law.
supra note 12, at 1424-25.
27. The dissenting opinion of Justice Peters, joined by Justice Sponzo, cannot easily be char-
acterized as responding to only one of the kinds of arguments discussed. The opinion relies heavily
on the "plain language" of the state constitutional text, which omits particular reference to state
acts. 192 Conn. at 71-72, 469 A.2d at 1213 (Peters, J., dissenting). On the other hand, it stresses
the difficulty associated with any attempt to investigate the actual historical intention of the con-
stitutional enactors, asserting inter alia that it is inappropriate to be bound by such an intention in
light of the need to make constitutional rules relevant to changing problems. Id. at 76, 469 A.2d
at 1215. This double-faceted approach reminds us that there is more than one reasonable defini-
tion of "interpretation," and that the relative roles of text, history, specific intent, general intent,
structure, and so forth may themselves be the subject of differing opinions, all of which claim to
refer in some way, not to contemporary judgments of proper values, but to an evaluation already
implicit in the Constitution. See Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L REv. 469
(1981). But in any event, the determination that there was no state action requirement in
Westfarms could not, itself, determine the proper constitutional result, since it was conceded that
not all private interference with speech was proscribed. For the determination of the "proper cir-
cumstances" in which the state constitution provides protection, the dissenting opinion relied on
the "limited claim" of the plaintiffs, which only demanded restrictive access to a single site. 192
Conn. at 81, 469 A.2d at 1218 (Peters, J., dissenting). In these circumstances, the dissenting
opinion called for a balancing of the rights involved and "agree[d with the trial court's determi-
nation that the balance in this case must be struck in the plaintiffs' favor." 192 Conn. at 84, 469
A.2d at 1219 (Peters, J., dissenting). Neither history nor text was called on to justify this balance.
The distinction being made in the text between a method of adjudication that looks to some
definition of constitutional protection implicit in the constitution and one which relies on a balanc-
ing of contemporary interests has also been manifested in the United States Supreme Court opin-
ions on the same subject. The idea that speech in private shopping centers is protected mas justi-
fled on the same kind of balancing of interests argued to the court in Westforms. The only
significant difference was that the conclusion in those federal cases was not that no state action
was required at all, but that state action was thereby present. This position is well represented in
the dissenting opinion of Justice Marshall in Hudgcns v. NLRB. 424 US. 508. 53943 (1976)
(Marshall, J., dissenting). This view is to be contrasted with the definitional approach of the
majority opinion in the Hudgens case.
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limitations protect individual action. 8 The first view, which is centrally
concerned with the text and the way in which it was understood by the
framers, represents what may be called the conventional understanding
of constitutional law, best expressed in the great case of Marbury v.
Madison.29 Power is limited and rights are created by virtue of rules
that are created at discrete moments and that remain essentially static
in meaning.30 To the extent such a view is taken seriously, it obviously
presents substantial difficulties. Rules created to deal with one set of
circumstances will almost certainly become inappropriate in some ways
as times change and new problems arise.31 Westfarms presents a clear
example. Assuming the free expression provision was intended to apply
only to governmenial interference, it may now-in light of the impor-
tance of privately owned places of public gathering-fail to vindicate
its primary purpose-to assure free and open discussion of matters of
public concern.32
The view of constitutional law and constitutional adjudication im-
plicit in the second kind of argument, which asks the court to evaluate
and balance the various interests involved, responds directly to the
problem of rigidity associated with the understanding based on static,
abstract constitutional rules. Such a position entails a belief in the pro-
priety of the court's shaping constitutional rules, in substantial mea-
sure, independently of the constraints of any historical text. It thus sees
a larger role for the wisdom, morals, and sense of the judges and a
correspondingly smaller role for the petrified judgments of the fram-
28. I have discussed the nature of this choice of approaches, which is necessarily prior to
positive constitutional law, somewhat more extensively in Kay, Preconstitutional Rules, 42 OiiiO
ST. L.J. 187 (1981). My discussion of two kinds of constitutional argument and adjudication, of
course, refers to ideal types, which we cannot reasonably expect to find exactly in the real world.
Rather, constitutional arguments and theories often may be seen as some compromise between
these two views. Moreover, the substantive bases of constitutional decisions based on one view,
sometimes may be accompanied by the rhetoric of a different view. Such combinations of sub-
stance and style themselves may be reasonably defended according to some particular notion of
public good. The two prototypes discussed here merely define a range of alternatives against which
such particular positions may be evaluated.
29. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
30. Linde, Judges, Critics, and the Realist Tradition. 82 YALE L.J. 227, 253-54 (1972).
31. See, e.g., Munzer & Nickel, Does the Constitution Mean What It Always Meant? 77
COLUM. L. REV. 1029, 1033 (1977) ("Because conditions have changed greatly since the Consti-
tution was written, we should expect that some of the results and rationales for decisions gener-
ated by a historical interpretation will be unappealing. It is not clear why the will of the people of
two hundred years ago should, aside from the wisdom that will contains, completely control our
constitutional practices today.").
32. 192 Conn. at 69-71, 469 A.2d at 1211-13 (Peters, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 16:667
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ers.33 Courts are more free to take into account the changing facts of
the world and to rank and reconcile conflicting values in that light. The
constitutional text and the original intention may then provide little
more than a mandatory list of factors which the judges must consult
and consider before making a decision.34 The difficulties associated
with this kind of constitutional law, of course, are just the opposite of
those attending the conventional position. The very flexibility and re-
sponsiveness that are its virtues necessarily create some amount of un-
predictability and instability in the constitutional protections provided.
This result is, arguably, in direct contradiction to the dominant purpose
of constitutional law, which is to define a sphere of private action that
is free from interference.35 If that sphere is subject to continuing and
unpredictable changes, its value is severely diminished.30
Observers of the constitutional decisions of the United States Su-
preme Court generally agree that it is this second type of adjudication
which has long prevailed .37 This becomes more apparent as more sub-
jects of constitutional adjudication tend to be subsumed in various
33. An extreme example of advocacy of unrestricted judicial discretion is found in Tushnet.
The Dilemmas of Liberal Constitutionalism, 42 OHIO ST. LJ. 411, 424 (1981) ("My answer, in
brief, is to make an explicitly political judgment: which result is, in the circumstances now ex-
isting, likely to advance the cause of socialism?"). More typical are the suggestions that judges
formulate constitutional rules according to one of a variety of models of decision incorporating
various restraints derived from history and tradition, political consensus, moral philosophy, or
some combination of factors other than the constitutional text. Three recent symposia give good
samples of the methods of constitutional adjudication advocated by modern scholars. Constitu-
tional Adjudication and Democratic Theory. 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 259 (1981); Judicial Review
Versus Democracy. 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1981); Judicial Review and the Constitution--The Text
and Beyond, 8 U. DAYTON L. REV. 443 (1983).
34. Cf. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, 13149 (1978).
35. "It is jealousy and not confidence which prescribes limited constitutions to bind down
those whom we are obliged to trust with power. . . .In questions of power, then, let no more be
heard of confidence in man, but bind him down from mischief by the chains of the Constitution:
4 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF TlE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 543 (2d ed. 1836) (remarks of Thomas Jefferson in the Virginia Ratification Con-
vention), quoted in R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 252 (1977).
36. See Kay, Book Review. 10 CONN. L. Rev. 801, 805 (1978) (reviewing R. BERGER, GOV-
ERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977)). The kind of balancing approach to constitutional adjudication
exemplified by the trial court decisions in Westfarms will necessarily yield less stable rules. One
commentator notes that those courts' decisions would "encourage, if not require, litigation of every
such conflict that may arise." Macgill, supra note 12, at 14. It is fair to ask whether it is appropri-
ate for adjudication which significantly omits any serious reference to the constitutional text to
invoke the term "constitutional" at all, since the constitution itself, definitionally. plays a marginal
role in the decisions and serves as an object not so much of interpretation as incantation. Cf. M.
PERRY, THE CONSTIrtTON, THE COURTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 143-44 (1982).
37. See R. BERGER, supra note 35; M. PERRY, supra note 36. at 64-70; Brest, The AMiscon-
ceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REv. 204, 222-23 (1980).
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"alancing" tests in which the court is to weigh and then, somehow,
compare the various interests at issue.38 Moreover, some forms of this
kind of decision-making, and the consequent reduction of the impor-
tance of text and history, have been advocated by most contemporary
academic commentators.3 9
The extent to which the same approach to constitutional adjudica-
tion prevails with respect to state constitutional law will, of course,
have significant consequences for the shape of the total system of con-
stitutional protections discussed above. If constitutional review on both
levels of government becomes largely untethered from the static coisti-
tutional texts and history, its protections will then derive only from the
attitudes and judgments of the men and women who serve as judges.
This is no insignificant protection. It has already been noted that much
of the genius of our constitutional system results, not from its creation
of explicit substantive rules, but from the structural rules that divide
effective power among numerous institutions. Courts operating accord-
ing to this second model provide another barrier of human judgment
which must be overcome before the will of the legislature and executive
can restrict individual activity. And, by virtue of the federal character
of the system, an additional fifty state courts may interpose their own
critical examinations in their respective jurisdictions and areas of com-
petence. But to the extent such adjudication displaces the conventional
kinds, the special protection that follows from the enforcement of spe-
cific and pre-defined substantive rights and limitations-with all its vir-
38. See, e.g., Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. 3001 (1983) (balancing test for violation of the eighth
amendment); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563-66
(1980) (balancing test for first amendment violations with respect to commercial speech); United
States Trust Co. of New York v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977) (balancing test for contracts
clause violation); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976) (balancing test for proce-
dural due process violations); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213-15 (1972) (balancing test-for
free exercise clause violation). The list might easily be extended.
39. See the symposia cited supra note 33 . This kind of adjudication has also been advocated
within the specific context of state constitutional law. See, e.g.. Margulies, supra note 24, at 109-
12; Newman, supra note 12, at 23 ("I suggest that within the grand design of the Old Federalism,
there is room for a little chemistry to be practiced by state court judges construing the fundamen-
tal legal document of their state-the State Constitution. Perhaps the discipline is more akin to
alchemy, for it seems very likely that the leaden language of many state constitutional provisions
is waiting to be turned into the pure gold of vital protections of individual rights."). With respect
to state constitutional adjudication, the most persistent theme in the literature is the role which
United States Supreme Court decisions regarding parallel federal constitutional provisions ought
to play when state courts apply the state constitution. See, e.g., State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 343-
46, 450 A.2d 952, 955 (1982); Developments in the Law, supra note 12, at 1347-56. Absent some
understanding that the state provision was adopted under the influence of the federal counterpart,
this question only makes sense if a non-interpretive approach is assumed.
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tues and defects-will substantially disappear.
In Cologne v. Westfarms Associates, the Supreme Court of Con-
necticut acted clearly and consciously on the basis of the conventional
view of constitutional adjudication. The question of whether the consti-
tution prevented private interference with expression was approached
by inquiring whether such a position could be attributed to the enactors
of the constitution, having the aims they had and using the language
they used. The court discussed the historical circumstances of the mak-
ing of constitutions in America in the late eighteenth and early nine-
teenth centuries. It found the overwhelming intent to be to put a limit
on governmental activity and found no evidence of any perceived need
to put constitutional limits on obnoxious private conduct.40 The court
considered whether this general conclusion about the reach of the con-
stitution ought to be modified in light of the specific language em-
ployed, which made no reference to state action, and determined that it
should not.4 1 The historical record on these matters is rather skimpy,
and no conclusions can be drawn with any certainty. The point, how-
ever, is not that the court's history was good or bad, but that it deemed
itself incompetent to make any other kinds of judgments in its
decision. 2
40. "It is evident that the concern which lead [sic] to the adoption of our Connecticut Dacla-
ration of Rights, as well as the bill of rights in our federal constitution, was the protection of
individual liberties against infringement by government. . . . There is nothing in the history of
these documents to suggest that they were intended to guard against private interference with
such rights." 192 Conn. at 61-62, 469 A.2d at 1208.
41. Id. at 62-63, 469 A.2d at 1208-09. The dissent takes issue with the majority's use of
historical evidence to construe the language of article I, section 4, claiming the court thereby
inferred ambiguity from clear textual language. Id. at 76, 469 A.2d at 1215 (Peters, J., dissent-
ing). It is not clear, however, that the absence of an explicit reference to government action cre-
ates an unequivocal right of protection from private interference with speech. An instructive anal-
ogy may be found in Barron v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 32 US. (7 Pet.) 243
(1833). Confronted with language in the due process clause of the fifth amendment of the United
States Constitution, which, like article I, section 4 of the Connecticut Constitution, made no refcr-
ence to state or federal action, Chief Justice Marshall refused to apply the prohibition to acts by a
state. He looked to the overall scheme of the Constitution to justify his conclusion that the provi-
sion aimed to limit federal action only. Id. at 247-51.
It should be stressed that the court's adherence in JVestfarms to conventional constitutional
interpretation did not compel any particular result. Had the court found historical justification for
a right to free speech against private interfercnce, it could then have gone on to reconcile the
competing private interests of the plaintiffs and defendants in this case in light of the historical
evidence defining the scope of the right conferred under the provision. This would have b en a
matter of line drawing rather than balancing.
42. This is not to say that such an understanding has informed the Connecticut Supreme
Court's constitutional adjudication in all cases. See, e.g., State v. Clemente, 166 Conn. 501, 353
A.2d 723 (1974); Kay, The Rule-Making Authority and Separation of Powers in Connecticut. 8
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The court's conviction that its proper concerns are limited is ex-
press in the decision. The court discussed the contention that it should
enter upon a weighing and balancing of the various interests at stake
and refused to do so, asserting that such exercises are appropriate for
legislatures but not for courts of law enforcing constitutional rights.
Indeed, the court embraced the very rigidity of constitutional rules and
their immunity from juridical change as a leading virtue of constitu-
tional government.43
Neither the understanding of constitutional law upon which the
court acted nor the one it rejected can have any claim to correctness as
a matter of law. It is usually common ground that a constitution pro-
vides the ultimate source of law in any legal system that it governs. But
the question here is: What is the constitution? What parts of it are
textual and what parts are unwritten, developed like the common law
or according to some other evolutionary process? It is quite clear there
is no place in the constitution to look up the answer to this question.'
Rather, our attachment to one view or the other, or to something in
between, is a function of our evaluation of the relative importance of
the values of stability and predictability on the one hand, and of flex-
ibility and adaptability on the other.4' That is to say, the meaning of
our constitutional system, at any given time, must be a matter of an
implicit, fundamental political choice. Such a choice may always be in
the process of being made and remade.' It is made by many people,
lawyers, scholars, and political actors as well as judges. Usually it is
made inarticulately, but occasionally, as in Westfarms, the choice is
forceful and clear.
CONN. L. REV. 1 (1975); Note, Court Rule-Making in Connecticut Revisited-Three Recent
Decisions: State v. King, Steadwell v. Warden and State v. Canady, supra note 1.
43.
This court has never viewed constitutional language as newly descended from the firma-
ment like fresh fallen snow upon which jurists may trace out their individual notions of
public policy uninhibited by the history which attended the adoption of the particular
phraseology at issue and the intentions of its authors. The faith which democratic socie-
ties repose in the written document as a shield against the arbitrary exercise of govern-
mental power would be illusory if those vested with the responsibility for construing and
applying disputed provisions were free to stray from the purposes of the originators,
192 Conn. at 62, 469 A.2d at 1208.
44. See Kay, Courts as Constitution-Makers in Canada and the United States, 4 Sup. CT, L.
REv. (Canada) 23 (1982).
45. See Kay, supra note 28, at 194-203.
46. See Alexander, Painting Without the Numbers: Noninterpretive Judicial Review, 8 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 447 (1983).
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